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CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT AS A
VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
JOSEPH L. FALVEY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Instances of rape are not uncommon within the context of
armed conflict.1 Armed conflict typically involves acts of domina-
tion, violence and power. Rape and other crimes of sexual violence
are crimes of domination, violence and power, not crimes of pas-
sion.2 When a society fails to deter such malevolent conduct, it
tends to occur more frequently.3 Similarly, when an armed force
fails to deter such conduct through adequate discipline and train-
ing, the use of rape and crimes of sexual violence as extensions of
the conflict will also occur more frequently.4 This problem is com-
pounded when participants in the armed conflict encourage or
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. B.A., Univer-
sity of Notre Dame; J.D., Notre Dame Law School; LL.M., The Judge Advocate General's
School of the Army.
1 See Margareth Etienne, Addressing Gender-Based Violence in an International Con-
text, 18 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 139, 139 (1995) (discussing prevalent use of mass rapes and
other violent acts against women as weapons of war and intimidation); see also Linda A.
Malone, Beyond Bosnia in Re Kasinga: A Feminist Perspective on Recent Developments in
Protecting Women from Sexual Violence, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 319, 320 (1996) (noting centu-
ries old prohibition of rape by soldiers proscribed by laws of war); see, e.g., AMEmCAS WATCH
& WOMEN's RIGHTS PROJECT, UNTOLD TERROR: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN PERU'S ARMED
CONFLICT 1-2 (1992) (reporting over forty documented cases of rape and sexual violence by
Peruvian soldiers against fellow nationals committed during course of routine security
checks and interrogations).
2 See Rosanna Cavallaro, A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake About Consent
in Rape, 86 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 860 (1990); see, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape,
Violence, and Women's Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359, 360-361 (1993) (examining
categorization of sexual crimes as two separate groups: rape ("intercourse by actual or
threatened physical violence") and sexual abuse or sexual misconduct ("nonviolent interfer-
ence with freedom of choice")).
3 See Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEx. J.
WOMEN & L. 41, 42 (1993). "[Clommon beliefs about morality of heterosexuality and cul-
tural understandings about what constitutes normal heterosexual practice account for
much of the failure of law reform to reduce the rate of rape and sexual abuse." Id.
4 See Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J.
651, 652 (1996) (stating concern over increased number of reported sexually violent crimes
committed by military personnel during peacetime).
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condone rape or other crimes of sexual violence as part of a sys-
tematic campaign of terror and intimidation.5 This appears to
have been the case in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, 6 and to
some extent, in Rwanda.'
The long list of atrocities already committed - and still being
committed - in the former Republic of Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda, are by now quite familiar. These crimes have included
ethnically motivated killings, genocide, massacres, torture, rape
and the expulsion of thousands from their traditional homes.8 To
try those responsible for these atrocities, the United Nations Se-
curity Council established an ad hoc International Tribunal.9
Most notable among the atrocities the Tribunal will consider is
the practice of ethnic cleansing and the systematic use of rape and
other crimes of sexual violence. 10
Few commentators could disagree that, under certain circum-
stances, rape is punishable as a violation of international law. In
fact, numerous articles have been written regarding this very is-
sue." These articles, however, fail to discuss the range of conduct
5 See, e.g., James Sterngold, Japan Admits Army Forced Women into War Brothels, N.Y.
TimEs, Aug. 5, 1993, at A2.
6 See Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Report of the
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex II,
Agenda Item 50, at 63-75, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411993/50 (1993); see also Fionnuala Ni Aolain,
The Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules in the Regulation of Sexual Violence in War,
60 ALB. L. REV. 883, 884 (1997) (discussing legal recognition of sexual offenses against
women during Yugoslavian conflict).
7 See AFRIcAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: DEATH, DESPAIR AND DEFIANCE 748-755 (rev. ed. 1995)
(recounting instances of mass rape and genocide of thousands of women during 1994
Rwandan armed conflict).
8 See, e.g., Steve Coll, In the Shadow of the Holocaust, WASH. POST MAG., Sept. 25, 1994,
at 8 (detailing horrors of Rwandan and Yugoslavian wars).
9 S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993),
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203, 1204 (1993). Security Council Resolution 827 created the Tri-
bunal by adopting the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 L.L.M. 1163 (1993)
[hereinafter Report]. The annex to the Report contains the Statute of the International
Tribunal. Report, supra, Annex at 36, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993)
[hereinafter Statute].
10 See Ivana Nizich, Violations of the Rules of War by Bosnian Croat and Muslim Forces
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 25-26 (1994) (noting Serbian war ef-
fort to expand territorial borders was primarily achieved through calculated campaign of
ethnic cleansing).
11 See, e.g., C.P.M. Cleiren & M.E.M. Tijssen, Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Assault in
the Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Legal, Procedural, and Evidentiary Issues, 5
CraM. L. FORUM 471, 472 (1994) (discussing prosecution of those accused of sexual assault
crimes in former Yugoslavia); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 60-61 (1993) (noting prevalence of violent crimes against women
generally); Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87
Am. J. INT'L L. 424, 424-428 (1993) [hereinafter Rape as a Crime] (discussing evolution of
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that ought to be punishable as a violation of "international hu-
manitarian law." Further discussion of the circumstances and
range of conduct under which crimes of sexual violence should be
punishable under international humanitarian law is therefore
necessary. This brief commentary will discuss such circumstances
and the range of criminal sexual conduct that ought to be punish-
able as a violation of international humanitarian law. Finally,
this commentary will propose a model for consideration by the in-
ternational community.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE AT
INTERNATIONAL LAw
Although the International Tribunal was given broad jurisdic-
tion to prosecute those responsible for specific offenses within gen-
eral categories of crimes,12 there are no substantive definitions of
these specific offenses under international law. Such definitions
appear necessary when the burden of proof is on the prosecutor to
prove the accused's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt."13 Without
definitions or "elements," the prosecutor may have difficulty deter-
mining what is to be proven and defendants may not be able to
adequately prepare their defense. Moreover, Tribunal judges may
disagree as to what must be proven, or may be incapable of deter-
mining whether the prosecutor has met the burden of proof with-
out prior agreement as to what conduct constitutes the crime. Fi-
nally, victims will be left in doubt until final conviction as to
whether the acts committed against them constitute violations of
international law.
While defining the content of customary international law risks
creating new substantive law, determining the "customary" defini-
tion is necessary given the absence of a "conventional" definition
sexual assault crimes in international conflicts); Kathleen M. Pratt & Laurel E. Fletcher,
Time for Justice: The Case for International Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Vio-
lence in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 77, 78 (1994) (beseeching inter-
national community to end sexual violence in former Yugoslavia); Tamara L. Tompkins,
Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeakable, 70 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 845,
847 (1995) (noting increase in crime of rape during international conflicts).
12 Statute, supra note 9, arts. 2-5.
13 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), amended by U.N. Doc. IT/
32/Rev.1 (1994), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.2 (1994), and U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.3 (1995); 33 I.L.M.
484, 532 [hereinafter I.T.R.P.E.], R. 87(A).
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of rape.' 4 Determining the "international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law" or "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations"15 would require a thorough analy-
sis of the basic understanding of the crime of rape in various legal
traditions. Such an analysis, however, is well beyond the scope of
this brief commentary.
A general understanding of rape, at least at common law, dem-
onstrates the need for further discussion and perhaps a "redefini-
tion" of the crime for purposes of prosecution as a violation of in-
ternational human rights law. At common law, rape was
"unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman against her will by
force or threat of immediate force."' 6 Such a definition of rape,
however, is unnecessarily limiting and does not cover the range of
conduct that should be punishable as a violation of international
law.17 Remedying this defect, however, requires a conventional
definition of rape or a "new" understanding of the conduct which
should be included within the traditional definition.'
What should such a "redefinition" include? First, the proscribed
conduct must encompass more than sexual intercourse. Tradi-
tionally, rape laws punished certain acts of sexual intercourse and
"lesser" criminal prohibitions covered other "sex crimes."' 9 This
14 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987) (depicting customary law as resulting from general, consistent practice of
states and followed from a sense of obligation).
15 Statute, supra note 9, art. 38 at 1(b)(c).
16 See, e.g., Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L.
REV. 19, 19 (1996) (noting common law definition of rape was "carnal knowledge of a wo-
man by force and against her will").
17 See, e.g., Arden Levy, International Prosecution of Rape in Warfare: Nondiscrimina-
tory Recognition and Enforcement, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 255, 257 (1994) (asserting that
wartime desire to control adversary's women has caused rape to evolve into ultimate sym-
bol of victory).
18 See Daphne Edwards, Acquaintance Rape and the 'Force' Element: When 'No' is Not
Enough, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 241, 258 (1996). Despite its 'Victim-oriented" ap-
proach, the Michigan 'violent sexual crimes" law definition of "force or coercion" neverthe-
less limits its "application to cases of conventional violence, while not addressing non-vio-
lent rape cases." Id. The danger here is that such a limited definition handcuffs courts into
a narrow construction of "force," thereby creating the judicial pitfall of ignoring "the vast
majority of rape cases that occur without injury or physical brutality." Id.
19 See Lani Anne Remick, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in
Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (1993). It is estimated that sixty to eighty percent of
rapes fit into a category of law "founded on the paradigm of violent stranger rape which
fails to clearly proscribe less violent rapes . . . in which some elements of a consensual
sexual encounter are present." Id. In this light, the non-traditional rape victims' inability to
avail themselves of the courts "to vindicate their rights... is thus one of the biggest imped-
iments to the comprehensive protection of female sexual autonomy under the law of rape."
Id. at 1104.
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limitation, however, fails to recognize that it is no less a violation
of a person's human rights and bodily integrity, and causes no less
injury to the victim, when the act involves forcible sodomy or pen-
etration with a foreign object.2 ° Moreover, traditional definitions
of rape failed to recognize that the crime of rape is not about sex-
ual interest or passion,2 1 but is about the domination by one per-
son of another through a violation of that person's bodily integrity
by acts of sexual violence.22 Thus, international law should not
only proscribe "rape" as that term is commonly understood, but
the entire range of criminal acts constituting crimes of sexual vio-
lence as well. Accordingly, these crimes are better described as
"crimes of sexual violence" rather than simply rape or "sex
crimes. " "
Second, the proscribed conduct must be described in gender-
neutral terms.24 Under traditional definitions of rape, only a wo-
man could be the victim of rape. 21 Moreover, because sexual inter-
course was the proscribed act, only a man could perpetrate the
crime.26 The perpetrator's gender, however, should be irrelevant
with respect to the degree of moral condemnation society should
attach to the use of sexual violence by one individual against an-
other. The international community should consider the conduct
no less a crime because the person whose body is violated is a man
being subjected to a bodily violation at the hands of a woman or
20 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 289(a) (West 1996) (defining rape as crime of 'penetration" by
"foreign object" of someone else's anal or genital openings against his or her will); see also
Pratt & Fletcher, supra note 11, at 78 (hoping international community will seek full ac-
countability for gender-specific offenses in the former Yugoslavia, since they contravene
fundamental principles of humanitarian law and violate basic, non-derogable human
rights).
21 See Roberts, supra note 2, at 359 (describing rape as embodying both physical harm
and subordinating sexuality).
22 Id.
23 See Cleiren & Tijssen, supra note 11, at 474 (asserting that rape and other types of
sexual assault should be regarded as crimes of violence of a sexual nature).
24 See Levy, supra note 17, at 262-63 (claiming that traditional concepts of fundamental,
universal human rights theoretically presuppose equality and gender neutrality) (citing
Jessica Neuwirth, Towards a Gender-Based Approach to Human Rights Violations, 9 WHIT-
TIER L. REV. 399, 406 (1987)).
25 See Brande Stellings, The Public Harm of Private Violence: Rape, Sex Discrimination
and Citizenship, 28 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 185, 186 (1993) (noting FBI rape statistics are
only compiled when victim is female).
26 See, e.g., Susannah Miller, The Overturning of Michael M.: Statutory Rape Law Be-
comes Gender-Neutral in California, 5 UCLA WoMEN's L.J. 289, 290 (1994) (noting Califor-
nia's original statutory rape law proscribed that only females could be victims and only
males could be punished).
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another man, or that the victim is a woman suffering at the hands
of another woman.
Third, although it is unlikely that the issue would ever arise
within the context of a violation of international law applicable to
armed conflict, the definition of crimes of sexual violence should
not provide for a marital exemption." Under some traditional def-
initions of rape, a husband was immune from prosecution for forc-
ing sexual intercourse upon his wife because no act of sexual in-
tercourse with one's wife was considered "unlawful."2" This view
stemmed from looking upon women as chattel subject to the unfet-
tered desires of their owner-husbands. 29 Although it is hard to im-
agine a set of circumstances where an accused might claim such a
"privilege" in the context of war crimes, international law should
not continue to propagate false notions that fail to recognize the
fundamental equal dignity of all.
Fourth, the definition of crimes of sexual violence should not ex-
plicitly or implicitly require "resistance" by the victim. 0 Tradi-
tionally, a woman had to affirmatively and substantially resist the
sexual intercourse unless the force or threat of force was such that
resistance would be useless.3 1 Moreover, minor force or threaten-
ing minor force was deemed insufficient to constitute rape.2 This
inappropriately focused on the victim's actions rather than the
perpetrator's conduct. 3 Even if criminal sexual behavior contin-
27 See Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Recon-
ceptualizing its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 677 (1996) (noting that although most
states do not recognize marital exceptions to rape, lingering cultural and moral barriers
still impede its prosecution).
28 See Eskow, supra note 27, at 680. At common law, a father was deemed to have valua-
ble economic property rights in a daughter's virginity, which were then acquired by a hus-
band in marriage and transformed into the husband's property right in the wife's fidelity.
Id. Consequently, no legal basis existed to prosecute husbands for raping their own wives,
since the husband did not infringe any man's property rights. Id.
29 See id. (explaining historical unities doctrine, whereby marriage made men and wo-
men one legal entity, women were "propertized," and husband assumed absolute control
over entity).
30 See Edwards, supra note 18, at 261-62 (noting many courts still require proof of resist-
ance, even though it is nearly impossible to demonstrate).
31 See id. at 261.
32 See Joshua Mark Fried, Forcing the Issue: An Analysis of the Various Standards of
Forcible Compulsion in Rape, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (1996) (noting standard required
female victim to show that she "resist[ed] to the upper limits of her physical ability").
33 See Allison West, Tougher Prosecution When the Rapist is Not a Stranger: Suggested
Reform to the California Penal Code, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 169, 173 (1994) (asserting
that difficult burden of demonstrating victim's nonconsent has shifted focus of rape reform
law to offender's forceful or violent conduct).
[Vol. 12:385
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ued to require proof of the victim's resistance,34 the requirement
of "force" or "threat of force" should be satisfied through recogni-
tion of "constructive" force capable of rendering the victim's resist-
ance unnecessary. Who would doubt the futility of a victim's
resistance when faced by a sexual aggressor who is also partici-
pating in an armed conflict as a combatant? Accordingly, the law
should not demand proof of resistance on the part of the victims of
such crimes occurring in armed conflict.
Fifth, although also unlikely to be an issue with regard to cases
of rape as violations of international humanitarian law,35 consent
should be viewed as an affirmative defense rather than as an ele-
ment of the crime. 6 Most would regard the "absence of consent" to
be an element of the offense or the "presence of consent" to be an
affirmative defense. 37 In either case, the issue of consent is prop-
erly part of the substantive definition of the crime.3 8 Addressing
the issue of consent as an affirmative defense, however, maintains
34 See Fried, supra note 32, at 1279 (noting burden of proof was on victim).
35 Admittedly, this discussion is largely academic given the nature of the allegations
arising in the former Yugoslavia. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts Estab-
lished Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc. S/19941674 Add.2, Vol. 1-5 at
245-49 (1992). According to the Commission of Experts investigating the atrocities commit-
ted in the former Yugoslavia, the rape and sexual assault allegations investigated fell
within five different patterns: (1) sexual assault committed in conjunction with looting and
intimidation of the target ethnic group; (2) sexual assaults committed in conjunction with
fighting in an area; (3) sexual assault committed on detained people; (4) sexual assaults
committed against women for the purpose of terrorizing and humiliating them, often as
part of the policy of "ethnic cleansing;" and (5) sexual assaults of women detained in hotels
or similar facilities for the sole purpose of sexually entertaining soldiers. Id. Consent would
not likely be an issue in cases arising in the context of any of these "patterns." Id.
36 See I.T.R.P.E., supra note 13, at R. 96(ii). Interestingly, the Tribunal rules originally
provided that "[clonsent shall not be allowed as a defense" in sexual assault cases. Id. Sub-
sequently, the Tribunal amended the rules to provide that consent is not a defense "if the
victim (a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence,
duress, detention, or psychological oppression; or (b) reasonably believed that if the victim
did not submit, another might be subjected to, threatened or put in fear." Id. In other
words, consent is not a defense unless it is voluntary. Id.
37 For two articles concerning the relationship of consent to allegations of rape and sex-
ual assaults see Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the
Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1799-1800 (1992)
(arguing for reclassification of sexual assaults into two categories: (1) sexual assaults (forci-
ble acts); and (2) sexual expropriation (non-consensual acts)); Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note,
Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 399 (1988) (arguing that definitions of sexual assault crimes
focus on force and consent remain as an affirmative defense).
38 But see John H. Biebel, I Thought She Said Yes: Sexual Assault in England and
America, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 153, 167 (1995) (noting courts usually concluded
that victim consented to intercourse if there was no evidence of resistance).
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the focus of the prosecution on the perpetrator's conduct rather
than the victim's actions and state of mind. 9
Finally, although it is an "evidentiary" or "procedural" rule
rather than part of the substantive definition, rape or "crimes of
sexual violence" punishable at international law should not re-
quire "corroboration."40 In fact, the International Tribunal's rules
provide that "no corroboration of the victim's testimony shall be
required"4 in sexual assault cases. In this regard, the Interna-
tional Tribunal has followed the modern trend.42 This should not
be surprising given that the justifications typically advanced to
support such a requirement are not concerns before a body such as
the International Tribunal. For example, false claims, although
possible, are not as likely within the context of war crimes as in
other contexts.4 3 Also, the International Tribunal is unlikely to be
so outraged by an allegation to the point of being unable to appro-
priately weigh the evidence and hold the prosecution to its burden
of proof." Finally, although the absence of a corroboration re-
quirement makes it somewhat more difficult to defend a rape alle-
gation 45 and eases the prosecution's burden of production, it does
39 See 65 Am. JuR. 2D Rape § 38 (1972).
Consent given at any time before penetration is a good defense to a prosecution for a
forcible rape, but the fact that the woman consented after the offense was consum-
mated is not a defense to the act. Even though a man may not be guilty of the crime of
rape, due to the fact that the woman consented before the intercourse, yet if, before the
consent was given, it appears that the defendant used force as to evince an intention to
commit rape, the defendant may be convicted of an assault with an intent to commit
rape. Since, by statutes in many jurisdictions, a female under a certain age is declared
incapable of consenting to an act of intercourse, it is no defense in a prosecution for
statutory rape that she did, in fact, consent.
Id. (citations omitted)
40 See 65 Am. JuR. 2D Rape § 94 (1972).
[I]n some jurisdictions, corroboration of the prosecutrix is necessary in prosecutions for
rape, statutory rape and assaults with intent to commit rape... [however, in other]
jurisdictions, the uncorroborated testimony of an unchaste prosecutrix, or even of one
whose reputation for chastity and truth is bad, may be sufficient to sustain a convic-
tion. Even where the defendant denies the crime, it has been held that the charge of
the prosecutrix, in order to prevail when denied by the defendant, must be corrobo-
rated by other facts.
Id. (citations omitted)
41 I.T.R.P.E., supra note 13, at R. 96(i).
42 See id. at 38. Specifically, the above-cited rule proscribes that "no corroboration of the
victim's testimony shall be required" in cases of rape or acts of sexual violence. Id.
43 See, e.g., Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J.
1365, 1373 (1972) (noting that corroboration requirement is justified by theory that it pre-
vents frivolous claims).
44 See id. at 1378 (claiming corroboration requirement protected defendant from unfair
conviction, imposed by emotionally enraged judge or jury).
45 See id. at 1382 (stating that corroboration requirement was partially based on diffi-
culty in defending against rape accusation); see also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J.
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not diminish its burdens of proof or persuasion.46 The prosecutor
must still convince the fact-finder of the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 47 Such a requirement will undoubtedly necessi-
tate that the prosecutor introduce "corroborating" evidence.48
III. A MODEL: CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT
The international community's willingness to create a tribunal
to consider war crime allegations is of tremendous precedential
importance. 49 The procedural and evidentiary rules used by the
International Tribunal50 will likely serve as models for future
tribunals and perhaps a permanent international criminal court
patterned after the International Court of Justice.51 Equally im-
1087, 1138 (1986) (noting lack of corroboration left only conflicting testimony of victim
against accused).
46 See ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES § 4 (1984). "Except for defenses that simply
negate an element of the offense, a defense will be submitted to the jury where the prosecu-
tion bears but fails to carry the burden of production or where the defendant bears and
successfully carries the burden." Id. (citations omitted)
47 See CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure § 500 (1982). The United States Constitution ensures that under a criminal
charge, the defendant can only be convicted according to the evidentiary standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. To this end,
A well-established principle of the common law, incorporated into the statutory provi-
sions of many states, that a person accused of [a] crime is presumed to be innocent
until he is proved to be guilty, and that in a criminal prosecution the state has the
burden of establishing all the essential elements of the crime with which the accused is
charged and must prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
48 See, e.g., 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1473 (1994). For example,
[C]orroboration of an accused's extrajudicial confession need not, to satisfy a convic-
tion, consist of evidence sufficient to prove the offense beyond a reasonable doubt or
even by a preponderance of the evidence, as long as there is substantial independent
evidence that the offense has been committed, and the evidence as a whole proves be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
Id. (citations omitted)
49 See David Stoelting, International Courts Flourish in 1990's, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 1997, at
S2. The process of enforcing criminal sanctions has always been an exclusive right reserved
to autonomous nations and, thus, "the right to apply punitive sanctions against individuals
is inextricably linked with the essence of sovereignty." Id. In keeping with these principles,
over the course of the past three years, formal ongoing U.N. sessions have centered on
establishing the groundwork for "the world's first permanent international criminal court
(ICC) which would exercise criminal jurisdiction concurrently with national courts." Id.
50 See United Nations International Law Commission: Report of the Working Group on a
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at
255-335, U.N. Doc. A/48/10, Annex (1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 253, 263-284 (1994) [here-
inafter Law Commission Report].
51 A permanent international criminal court was first proposed in 1950 by the United
Nations International Law Commission (ILC). For the next 45 years, the proposal lan-
guished because of the absence of consensus as to the governing law and the unwillingness
of States to cede a portion of their sovereignty. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Chris-
topher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Criminal Court in the New Interna-
tional World Order, 25 VAlD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time
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portant, however, is the precedential importance of the substan-
tive law applied by the International Tribunal.52 In light of these
eventualities, and the attempts in the international community to
draft a criminal code for a permanent international criminal
court, 3 a comprehensive "criminal sexual conduct statute," such
as that found in Michigan, 54 may serve as a model for considera-
tion by the international community satisfying the concerns enu-
merated above. The following paragraphs discuss this statute, fo-
cusing on the first degree offense, and compare the major
components of the statute with the shortcomings of the common
law understanding of rape.
Focusing on the Michigan statute seems appropriate given that,
of the states that have reformed their rape laws, Michigan is
among the few hailed as going the furthest toward reducing the
incidents of sex crimes. 5 Moreover, since 1974 when the reforms
took effect, a general consensus has emerged that Michigan's rape
reform is worthy in its effort, as it focuses the crime on the defend-
ant's conduct and away from the victim's state of mind.56
Michigan's reform began with a repeal of its "rape" law57 in
favor of the more comprehensive "criminal sexual conduct" stat-
Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1991).
The success of the international community in creating the International Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia had sparked renewed interest in a permanent international criminal
court. Id.
52 See generally Law Commission Report, supra note 50, at 270-271.
53 See generally James Crawford, The 1LC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Tribunal, 88 Am. J. IN'L L. 140, 141 (1994) (asserting that resurgence of worldwide human
rights violations has intensified need for international criminal court statute).
54 See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520a to 750.520m (West 1991) (dividing rape into
four degrees of criminal sexual conduct depending upon circumstances at time of such
conduct).
55 See Beverly J. Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make a Difference?: A Look at
the Law of Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 853 (1996) (noting that greatest increase of rape
reporting was in Michigan, where strongest reform was enacted; New York and Illinois are
also frequently cited); see also Cassia C. Spohn & Julie Homey, Criminology: The Impact of
Rape Law Reform on the Processing of Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 861, 865-66 (1996) (stating that Michigan adopted strongest and most com-
prehensive reforms regarding rape by any state); Wicktom, supra note 37, at 415 (crediting
Michigan and New York's rape statutes with influencing reform efforts in other states).
56 See Wicktom, supra note 37, at 418 (noting Michigan was first state to shift focus of
rape law from victim's nonconsent to defendant's forceful or violent conduct); see also Rob-
ert J. Haddad & Erich H. Hintzen, Evidence, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 41 WAYNE L.
REV. 907, 935 (1994-1995) (explaining that Michigan Courts have ruled that evidence of
rape victim's sexual conduct and reputation are inadmissible).
57 See 1952 MICH. PuB. AcTs 73, repealed by 1974 MICH. PuB. AcTs 266. Before 1974,
Michigan's rape statute adhered to the common law definition of rape and stated that:
Any person who shall ravish and carnally know any female of the age of 16 years, or
more, by force and against her will.., shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by impris-
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utes.58 Under the then existing definition of rape, often "the victim
was treated more harshly in trial than the rapist."5 9 Overall dis-
satisfaction with a criminal justice system and a definition of a
crime that would permit the victim to be treated so harshly finally
persuaded the Michigan legislature to repeal the existing rape
statute6 0 and adopt the criminal sexual conduct statute.6 '
The legislature's intent was to increase the range of conduct
qualifying as criminal sexual behavior.62 The new law scaled four
gender-neutral degrees of criminal sexual conduct 63 based on the
severity of the offense and criminalized activities that were not
punishable under the old law.6 4
A. The Statutory Definition of Criminal Sexual Conduct
The Michigan criminal sexual conduct statute makes punish-
able various acts of "sexual penetration"65 and "sexual conduct."
66
onment in the state prison for life or for any term of years.... Such carnal knowledge
shall be deemed complete upon proof of any sexual penetration however slight.
Id.
58 MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520a to 750.520g (West 1997). These sections classify
crimes of sexual violence into four different degrees of criminal sexual conduct and one
assault with intent to commit a criminal sexual conduct offense.
59 See People v. Nelson, 261 N.W.2d 299, 306 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (discussing public
dissatisfaction over old rape statute), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 281
N.W.2d 134 (Mich. 1979) (upholding two convictions of criminal sexual conduct in first de-
gree and vacating conviction of two counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct while
armed with weapon); see also MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.520j (West 1997) (regarding
admissibility of victim's sexual conduct); People v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Mich. 1996)
(explaining that victims would not testify "because they knew their private lives would be
cross-examined") (quoting House Legislative Analysis 58, 1207, July 18, 1974); People v.
Mooney, 549 N.W.2d 65,69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that purpose of rape shield law is
to protect victims from humiliating public "fishing expeditions" into their past sexual
conduct).
60 See 1952 MICH. PuB. AcTs 73, repealed by 1974 MICH. PUB. ACTS 266 (proscribing
Michigan's original rape statute).
61 See Nelson, 261 N.W.2d at 306 (discussing reasons behind enactment of criminal sex-
ual conduct statute).
62 See id. at 307-08 (noting purpose of statute was to strengthen criminal law describing
unlawful sexual conduct).
63 See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520a to 750.520e (West 1997); see also MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520a(m) (West 1997) (defining "victim" as person alleging to have
been subjected to criminal sexual conduct).
64 See 1952 MICH. PuB. AcTs 73, repealed by 1974 MICH. PUB. ACTS 266 (proscribing
Michigan's original rape statute).
65 MICH. Colmip. LAws ANN. § 750.520a(l) (West 1997) (defining "sexual penetration" as
"sexual intercourse, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any
part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's
body, but emission of semen is not required"). See People v. Hammons, 534 N.W.2d 183,
183 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding act of forcing finger into vagina of nine year old through
her underwear constituted "sexual penetration"); People v. Legg. 494 N.W.2d 797, 797
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (asserting that cunnilingus involves act of "sexual penetration").
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The statute is scaled from first to fourth degree criminal sexual
conduct depending on whether the act involves penetration or con-
tact.67 The law also considers whether the sexual penetration or
contact is committed under certain circumstances or with a partic-
ular result.68
First and third degree criminal sexual conduct6 9 (CSCI and
CSCIII) proscribe sexual penetration committed under certain cir-
cumstances, including when force or coercion 70 is used, to achieve
the sexual penetration of the victim. CSCI is distinguished from
CSCIII by the existence of certain enumerated aggravating fac-
tors.71 Foremost among these factors is the infliction of personal
injury.7 2
66 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(l) (West 1997) (defining "sexual penetration");
see also MICH. CoMP. LAWS. ANN. § 750.520a(k) (West 1997) (defining "sexual contact" as
including "the intentional touching of the victim's or actor's intimate parts or the inten-
tional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's inti-
mate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the pur-
pose of sexual arousal or gratification").
67 MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520b to 750.520e (West 1997) [also referred to as
CSCI, CSCII, CSCIII and CSCIVI (proscribing four varying degrees of criminal sexual
conduct).
68 See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b to 750.520e (West 1997) (proscribing varying
degrees of criminal sexual conduct).
69 MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520b (CSCI) and 750.520d (CSCIII) (West 1997) (de-
fining first and third degree criminal sexual conduct); see also infra note 76 and accompa-
nying text (aggravating factors include, for example, commission of felony, being helped by
another person, and inflicting personal injury).
70 See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.520b(1)(f(i)-(v) (West 1997). Specifically, the law
allows for prosecution of persons that use force with or without violence to "overcome" the
victim, and also those that use only the suggestion of force, positional authority, or the
threat of retaliation. Id.
71 MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520b (1997). The crime of criminal sexual conduct in
the first degree includes such factors considered to aggravate the offense such as the age of
the victim, the victim's mental capacity, the amount and force used, whether there was
more than one perpetrator, whether the act was part of the commission of another felony,
whether a weapon was used, if the victim was related to the perpetrator and whether the
perpetrator was in a position of authority to coerce the victim. Id. As can be seen from the
long list of the circumstances that elevate the offense to first degree criminal sexual con-
duct, the Michigan statute is applicable to many more sexual offenses than the traditional
common law rape statute. Id.
72 See MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520b(1)(f)(i)-(v) (West 1997) (including personal in-
jury to victim among circumstances defined in statute); see also MICH. Comn. LAws ANN.
§ 750.520a(j) (West 1997) (defining personal injury as meaning "bodily injury, disfigure-
ment, mental anguish, chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual
or reproductive organ"); People v. Brown, 495 N.W.2d 812, 812 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (hold-
ing that personal injury needed to support conviction of first degree criminal sexual con-
duct was established when defendant came upon sexual assault victim while victim was
distraught and upset due to kidnapping and rape of victim by other men, even though
defendant was not responsible for personal injury); People v. Jenkins, 328 N.W.2d 403,
404-405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that to satisfy bodily injury, injury need not be
permanent or substantial); cf MIcH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520d(i)(b) (West 1997) (defin-
ing third degree criminal sexual assault as only requiring that sexual penetration be ac-
complished through force or coercion without requirement of injury).
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Second degree criminal sexual conduct 7 3 (CSCII) mirrors CSCI
with the distinction that the actor need only engage in sexual
"contact" rather than sexual penetration. 74 Touching any of the
victim's genital areas or the clothing covering those areas qualifies
as a violation of the law. 5 Also punishable as CSCII is when the
actor touches his or her own genitalia in the presence of the victim
for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.76 CSCIV, on the
other hand, is similar to CSCII in punishing sexual contact com-
mitted through force or coercion, 77 but, like the distinction be-
tween CSCI and CSCIII, CSCIV does not require that the victim
sustain personal injury.78
The extensive list of aggravating circumstances that elevate an
offense from CSCIII to CSCI or from CSCIV to CSCII encom-
passes many crimes of sexual violence that traditionally would not
be equated with the crime of rape.79 Moreover, as with common
law rape, 0 CSCI and CSCIII are general intent crimes that do not
require that the penetration under one of the enumerated circum-
stances be for the purpose of sexual gratification.8 '
73 MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.520c (West 1997) (defining second degree criminal sex-
ual conduct).
74 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520a, 750.520b (West 1997) (differentiating between
degrees).
75 See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520a(k) (West 1997) (defining sexual contact); see
also People v. Duenaz, 384 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that intentionally
touching breasts constituted sexual contact).
76 See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.520a(k) (West 1997).
77 See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520e (West 1997). Defining fourth degree criminal
sexual conduct, the statute provides:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if he or she en-
gages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following circumstances
exist: (a) That other person is at least 13 years of age and under 16 years of age, and
the actor is 5 or more years older than that other person.
(b) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the sexual contact.
Id.
78 See id. (describing fourth degree criminal sexual conduct); see also supra note 72 and
accompanying text (discussing personal injury).
79 See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520a to 750.520e (West 1997) (listing criminal
sexual conduct statutes); see also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (describing
Michigan's old rape statute and the enactment of the new criminal sexual conduct
statutes).
80 For an analysis of the traditional and common law derivations of the elements of the
crime of rape, see supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
81 See People v. Garrow, 298 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (holding statute's
plain meaning meant act of criminal sexual conduct in first [or third] degree is committed
when there is intrusion into genital or anal opening of another person, regardless of the
actor's sexual purpose).
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B. The Statutory Definition of Sexual Penetration
One of the methods used by the legislature to broaden the acts
that are punishable under the Michigan statute draws from the
long list of circumstances that elevate an offense to first degree
criminal sexual conduct. 82 Moreover, the manner in which sexual
penetration is defined further demonstrates the breadth of con-
duct intended to be proscribed by the legislature. s3
For example, the definitional section of the statute states,
"[slexual penetration means sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fella-
tio, anal intercourse or any other intrusion, however slight, of any
part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person's body, but emission of semen is not
required." 4 Accordingly, the statute criminalizes a broader range
of sexual penetration than vaginal-penile penetration and puts
sexual assaults that do not fall within the traditional definition of
rape, such as forcible anal sodomy, on equal footing with vaginal-
penile "rape.""5 Moreover, the bodily intrusion need not be com-
mitted with a part of the human body, but the offense is complete
with the penetration of the victim's genital or anal opening with
"any object."86
Additionally, the definition of sexual penetration "does not state
that, if these defined acts include penetration, they are penetra-
tion within the meaning of this section.""7 Instead, "the acts in
and of themselves are acts that involve sexual penetration." 8
Therefore, if one of the acts outlined in the definition are per-
formed, there is no requirement that there be something addi-
tional by way of penetration for CSCI or CSCIII to have been com-
mitted.8 9 The criminal sexual contact statute includes a similarly
broad definition of the sexual contact necessary for CSCII and
CSCIV. This includes "the intentional touching of the victim's or
82 See generally MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520a to 750.520e (West 1997) (setting
forth factors used in deciding each level of offense).
83 See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520a(1) (West 1997).
84 See id.
15 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 16, at 21 (discussing characteristics of Michigan's rape
statute).
86 See MICHIGAN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 20.1 (CJI 2d 20.1). Sexual penetration
has even been interpreted to include such bodily violations as the forcing of the victim's
underwear into her vagina by the defendant's fingers. Id.; see, e.g., People v. Hammons, 534
N.W.2d 183, 184 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
87 People v. Harris, 404 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
88 Id.
89 Id.
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actor's intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing
covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate
parts, if that touching can reasonably be construed as being for
the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification."9"
C. Gender-Neutrality
In addition to broadly defining the circumstances and range of
conduct punishable as criminal sexual conduct, the criminal sex-
ual conduct statute is gender-neutral, further expanding the scope
of protection provided by the law.9 ' The statute describing first
degree criminal sexual conduct is written in gender-neutral terms
and uses the phrase "he or she" when describing the perpetrator
and the term "person" when describing the victim of the crime.92
As such, Michigan's criminal sexual conduct statute is unbiased in
its prosecution based upon an alleged perpetrator's gender.93
This gender-neutral description of the crime is in sharp contrast
to the traditional common law definition of rape where the assail-
ant had to be a man and the victim a female.94 The description of
the crime in gender-neutral language is desirable because it al-
lows prosecution of crimes that would not be allowed under the
traditional common law definition of rape. It also allows for prose-
cution under the same statute as other similar crimes.9 5
D. Resistance By the Victim
Another change from the traditional understanding of rape em-
braced by the criminal sexual conduct statute is the express elimi-
nation of the requirement that the victim resist the sexual as-
sault.96 At common law the victim was required to resist to the
90 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520a(k) (West 1997).
91 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520b to 750.520e. (West 1997) (including gen-
der-neutral language in first through fourth degree criminal sexual conduct).
92 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b (West 1997) (using gender-neutral language
to describe actors).
93 Id. See People v. Malkowski, 499 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (convicting
male defendant for raping male).
94 65 AM. JuR. 2D Rape § 27 (1972). A somewhat dated and obsolete entry of Am. Jur. 2d
states: "It is unquestioned that the act constituting the basis of the crime of rape can be
committed by a male person only so that in the common-law and statutory definitions the
sex of the perpetrator of the offense is seldom if ever mentioned." Id.
95 See Murphy, supra note 16, at 21 (describing Michigan's rape statute); see, e.g., Mal-
kowski, 499 N.W.2d at 452 (convicting defendant of male on male assault under criminal
sexual conduct statute, formerly unpunishable under common law rape statute).
96 See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520i (West 1997). "A victim need not resist the
actor in prosecution under sections 520b to 520g." Id.
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utmost in order for the prosecution to prove non-consent to the
act.9 7 Although all United States jurisdictions have negated the
"utmost resistance requirement,"98 many jurisdictions require a
showing of reasonable resistance under the circumstances. 99 The
Michigan criminal sexual conduct statute adopted the view that
resistance is not a valid indicator of the victim's non-consent and
that requiring resistance may cause a risk of serious bodily injury
or death.10 0 Eliminating the resistance requirement appropriately
shifts the focus to the perpetrator's use of force or coercion to ac-
complish the offense, and away from the victim's state of mind. 101
E. Consent as an Element of Criminal Sexual Conduct
Closely related to the elimination of the resistance requirement
is the elimination of consent from the definition of the offense.
Unlike the repealed rape law, which provided that the offense
97 65 AM. JuR. 2D Rape § 5. This section provides that:
The well-settled general rule is that carnal act must have been committed against the
resistance of the woman. The importance of resistance is to establish two elements in
the crime - carnal knowledge by force by one of the parties and nonconsent thereto by
the other. These are essential in every case in which the complainant had the use of
her faculties and physical powers at the time, and was not prevented by terror or the
exhibition of brutal force.
Id. (citations omitted).
98 See 65 AM. JuR. 2D Rape § 6. This section specifies that:
Resistance or opposition by mere words is not enough; the resistance must be by acts.
While some courts require the utmost resistance, and the most vehement exercise of
every physical means or faculty within the woman's power to resist the penetration of
her person, it is more generally recognized that resistance is necessarily relative, and
the woman, if her resistance is bona fide, is not required to resist to the utmost of her
physical strength if she reasonably believes that resistance would be useless and result
in serious bodily injury to her.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Laughlin v. United States, 368 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1967). The
Laughlin court held that it "is no longer the law that a person attacked and threatened
with rape must fight [to the] 'last ditch stage. Threats ... of bodily harm ... with some
degree of physical force' is sufficient." Id. at 559 (quoting Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d
633 (U.S. App. D.C. 1942).
99 See State v. Lima, 643 P.2d 536, 539 (Haw. 1982) (requiring genuine physical effort on
part of victim to discourage assailant from his intended purpose); see also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 213.1 cmt.4, at 304-7 (1980) (discussing Model Code's focus on actor's use of force).
100 See People v. Nelson, 261 N.W.2d 299, 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (explaining that
focus is on force or coercion of assailant and not on victim's consent or resistance); see also
Murphy, supra note 16, at 21 (noting studies indicate that incidence and degree of violence
in rape are heightened when woman physically resists).
101 See Edwards, supra note 18, at 251. Arguably, the single-most significant rape law
reform to take place in the 1970's was redefining the common law crime "to shift the focus
away from scrutinizing the victim's behavior at trial." Id. Previously, the pitfall had been
that the "element of lack of consent and resistance had enabled the courts to focus atten-
tion solely on the propriety of the victim's behavior." Id. It was with this problem in mind
that the "reformers hoped to redefine the offense to focus on the defendant's criminal con-
duct or his use of 'force' instead." Id. at 251-52.
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must be against the victim's will or without her consent, 0 2 the
criminal sexual conduct statute is silent as to the issue of the con-
sent of the victim. 10 3 "Although consent is clearly admissible to
show lack of force or coercion, it does not, under this statute, rise
to the level of an element of the offense, lack of which the people
must prove."1 0 4 The omission of non-consent as an element of the
offense was a calculated act of the legislature:
The bill eliminates the present requirement that the non-con-
sent of the victim must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt"
at the outset of the "rape" trial. The question as to whether or
not the victim consented is not an issue in any felony other
than rape. This bill would make the rape standard consistent
with the standard for other felonies by allowing the victim to
assess rationally the danger of injury or death and conduct
herselflhimself accordingly. 105
This omission of consent shifted the focus from the victim's con-
sent to whether force or coercion was used to accomplish the
penetration. 10 6
This is not to say, however, that the legislature intended "to pre-
clude an accused from alleging consent as a defense to the
charge."07 Once successfully raised as an affirmative defense, the
prosecutor may have to prove the victim did not consent or that
the victim physically resisted or verbally rebuffed the defendant's
advances.' 0 Thus, the criminal sexual conduct statute does not
fully eliminate issues regarding the victim's non-consent or com-
pletely remove issues regarding the degree of resistance. The law,
however, successfully shifts the focus to the force or coercion of the
102 See generally supra note 57 and accompanying text.
103 See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.520a-750.520g (West 1996) (eliminating require-
ment of consent in criminal sexual conduct statute for rape).
104 People v. Stull, 338 N.W.2d 403, 406 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (citing People v. Khan,
264 N.W.2d 360 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978)) (categorizing consent as no longer rising to level of
element in defense).
105 See Nelson, 261 N.W.2d at 307 (explaining that focus is on force or coercion of assail-
ant, not victim's consent or resistance).
106 See People v. Khan, 264 N.W.2d 360, 366 (Mich Ct. App. 1978) (citing People v. Oli-
phant, 250 N.W.2d 433, 459 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (Levin, J., dissenting)) (discussing Michi-
gan's criminal sexual conduct statute's shift towards focusing on force or coercion).
107 Stull, 338 N.W.2d at 407 (citing People v. Hearns, 300 N.W.2d 396 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980)) (leaving lack of consent as possible, albeit, limited defense).
108 See People v. Thompson, 324 N.W.2d 22, 23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing defend-
ant's right to have jury determine consent when raised as affirmative defense).
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defendant and relegates consent to the role of an affirmative de-
fense to be raised and proven by the defense. °9
F. Corroboration of the Victim's Testimony
Just as the criminal sexual conduct statute negates the require-
ment of resistance by the victim, it also does not require any cor-
roboration of the victim's testimony. 10 Even before the enactment
of the criminal sexual conduct statute, Michigan courts had held
that a rape case should not be dismissed because the victim's tes-
timony was not corroborated."' The courts based this holding on
the notion that it was within the jury's province to determine the
credibility of a witness, and if the charges were dismissed because
the victim's testimony lacked corroboration, the court would be
performing a function allocated to the finder of fact." 2 Thus, the
criminal sexual conduct statute simply codified what the Michigan
courts had previously interpreted as the law of Michigan." 3
G. The Marital Rape Exemption
The latest amendment to the criminal sexual conduct statute
further expanded the range of conduct punishable under the stat-
ute by eliminating the spousal exception to the prosecution of
criminal sexual conduct." 4 Prior to 1988, Michigan had retained
the spousal exception to the criminal sexual conduct statute." 5
Under this exception, the victim's spouse was immune from prose-
cution for criminal sexual conduct." 6 This marital rape exemption
109 See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.520i (West 1997) (stating that victim does not
have to resist actor).
110 See MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 750.520h (West 1997) (proscribing that testimony of
victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions).
111 See, e.g., People v. Inman, 24 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 1949). The court, in response to
an argument by the defendant that a conviction in a rape case could not be sustained by the
uncorroborated testimony of the victim, stated, "[tihe rule in most jurisdictions is that in
the absence of statute, a conviction for rape may be sustained on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of the prosecutrix." Id.
112 See id.
113 See People v. Smith, 385 N.W.2d 654, 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). In a post-enactment
case, the Michigan Court of Appeals reaffirmed the prior judicial standard holding that it
was not an error to give a jury instruction that, to convict the defendant, the victim's testi-
mony need not be corroborated. Id.
114 See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.520(a) (West 1997).
115 See MICH. COMp. LAws § 750.520 (repealed by 1974 MICH. PUB. ACTS 266); see also
supra note 62 and accompanying text.
116 See MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 750.520 (West 1997); see also People v. Hawkins, 407
N.W.2d 366, 366 (Mich. 1987). Reversing the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Michigan
Supreme Court confirmed that § 12 of the old "statute prohibiting criminal sexual conduct
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is a vestige of English common law and derives from three com-
mon law presumptions: (1) Women gave up their right to refuse to
have sexual relations upon marriage; (2) married women merged
into the existence of their husbands; and (3) women became chat-
tel of their husbands upon marriage. 117 These archaic justifica-
tions for the marital rape exemption faded with the recognition of
the individual rights of women. 118
Michigan's legislative amendment resulted from the appeal of a
criminal conviction for marital rape." 9 Instead of deciding the
case on constitutional grounds,1 20 the Michigan Supreme Court
decided the case on the basis of statutory construction.1 2 1 Michi-
gan's public interest and women's rights groups reacted intensely
to the Michigan Court of Appeals' vacation of the accused's convic-
tion, 12 and the Michigan Supreme Court's refusal to uphold the
conviction on constitutional grounds. 123 This reaction prompted
the legislature to abolish the marital exception.124 "The simple,
straightforward abolition of the marital rape exemption in the
criminal sexual conduct statute mandates that a husband be ar-
[did indeed] provide] [ for spousal immunity' unless the couple are living apart and one of
them has filed for separate maintenance or divorce." Id. See generally supra note 57.
117 See Judith A. Lincoln, Abolishing the Marital Rape Exemption: The First Step in Pro-
tecting Married Women from Spouse Rape, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1219, 1220-21 (1989) (noting
that presumption at common law was that married women became chattel of husband).
118 See id.
119 See People v. Hawkins, 407 N.W.2d 366, 366 (Mich. 1987) (appealing rape conviction
on basis of marital rape exception).
120 See, e.g., People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 567 (N.Y. 1984). In a landmark decision,
the New York Court of Appeals struck down the marital exemption portion of New York's
forcible rape statute as unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Id.
121 See Hawkins, 407 N.W.2d at 366. The defendant sought reversal of his conviction of
criminal sexual conduct in the trial court based on the marital exemption, which only al-
lowed prosecution if the couple were living separately and had filed for divorce. Id. The
couple were living separately and had filed for divorce, but had done so incorrectly. Id. The
Supreme Court, rather than deciding the equal protection issue, found that the defendant
was not subject to the marital rape exemption because even though the divorce might not
be legally binding it showed the objective ending of the marriage. Id.
122 See, e.g., Michigan Rape Law to be Toughened, CH. TPIB., Feb. 24, 1987, at 3 (follow-
ing public outcry regarding Hawkins ruling freeing man convicted of raping estranged wife,
Michigan Senate Judiciary Committee drafted new law ridding Michigan rape law of
spousal exception).
123 Hawkins, 407 N.W.2d at 367 (reversing lower court ruling).
124 See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 750.5201 (West 1997). The amended statute now reads:
'A person may be charged and convicted under sections 520b to 520g even though the vic-
tim is his or her legal spouse. However, a person may not be charged or convicted solely
because his or her legal spouse is under the age of 16, mentally incapable, or mentally
incapacitated." Id.
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rested, prosecuted and convicted for any type of criminal sexual
conduct involving his wife."' 2 5
IV. JURISDICTIONAL "AGGRAVATING" ELEMENTS
Not all acts of rape or crimes of sexual violence, however, are
punishable as violations of international law. 126 To the contrary,
the subject matter jurisdiction of the International Tribunal is
limited to "serious violations of international humanitarian
law."12' The statute identifies four categories of crimes within this
jurisdiction: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; 28 viola-
tions of the laws and customs of war; 29 genocide;' 30 and crimes
against humanity. 13 ' A permanent international criminal court
would likely be subject to similar jurisdictional constraints. Lim-
iting an international tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction to
such crimes advances the principle of "nullum crimen sine lege" -
no crime without law.' 32 It is important that the International
Tribunal, or a permanent tribunal, not create or legislate the
law. 133 Instead, the role of such a tribunal should be to simply
apply existing international humanitarian law.' Any attempt by
the International Tribunal, or any other such tribunal, to create
law would likely prevent some nations from cooperating with the
creation or functioning of such a tribunal. 35
125 Lincoln, supra note 122, at 1242.
126 See Pratt & Fletcher, supra note 11, at 81. Instances of rape and violent sex crimes
have always been a pervasive element of armed conflicts throughout the world. Id. This fact
notwithstanding, "gender-specific violations of humanitarian and human rights law have
not been accorded the same attention as other violations either in prosecutions for serious
violations of international law, or in reports by U.N. entities charged with investigating
and reporting on human rights violations." Id.
127 Report, supra note 9, at par. 31.
128 See Statute, supra note 9, Annex at art. 2.
129 See id. at art. 3.
130 See id. at art. 4.
131 See id. at art. 5.
132 See Report, supra note 9, at par. 34.
133 See I.T.P.R.E., supra note 13, at par. 29 (explaining that International Tribunal
should prosecute by applying existing international humanitarian law, not by legislating or
creating new law).
134 See id. This will also avoid the difficulty presented by "adherence of some but not all
States to specific conventions." Id. at par. 34.
135 See Report, supra note 9, at par. 34 (stating doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege re-
quires that ICC apply rules of international humanitarian law, which are part of custom-
ary law); see also United Nations International Law Commission: Report of the Working
Group on a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess.,
2298th mtg., Supp. 10, Art. 23, at 255-335, U.N. Doc. A/48/10 (1993), reprinted in 33 I.L.M.
253, 266-67 (1994) [hereinafter Commission Report] (delineating procedure by which
"[aicceptance by States of jurisdiction over crimes listed in Article 22" is conferred on ICC).
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Only these four general categories of crimes that are "beyond
doubt .. part of international customary law ... applicable in
armed conflict,"136 and other specific acts that are within the ac-
cepted definitions of these crimes, fall within the International
Tribunal's subject matter jurisdiction. 3 v Other violations of inter-
national humanitarian law and ordinary crimes would not fall
within the Tribunal's jurisdiction and would be punishable only by
national courts.
Thus, even though an individual accused's conduct may satisfy
the requisites to characterize the conduct as rape or another crime
of sexual violence, punishing the crime as a violation of interna-
tional humanitarian law requires something more.138 The crime
must also fall within one of the four general categories of crimes
inclusive of the subject matter jurisdiction of the International
Tribunal. 139
A. Rape as a Crime Against Humanity
Rape or other crimes of sexual violence committed within the
context of a "widespread or systematic attack" against a civilian
population on "national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious
grounds" constitute crimes against humanity as that term is un-
derstood. 4 ° Generally, establishing crimes against humanity re-
quires, as a necessary element, proof of systematic governmental
planning and action.' 4 ' Thus, to convict an individual accused of
136 I.T.P.R.E., supra note 13, at par. 35.
137 See Commission Report, supra note 135, 33 I.L.M. at 264-65 (setting forth specific
treaty defined crimes that confer concurrent subject matter jurisdiction on proposed Inter-
national Criminal Court).
138 See Report, supra note 9, at par. 34 (asserting that ICC's application of international
customary law will strengthen its power to prosecute persons responsible for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law).
139 See generally Rape as a Crime, supra note 11, at 425 n.5 (noting that proposed com-
petence of Tribunal encompasses grave breaches of Geneva Conventions, violations of laws
and customs of war, genocide, and crime against humanity). See, e.g., U.N. Doc. 5/25704,
Annex, Arts. 2-5 (1993).
140 See Report, supra note 9, at para. 48.
141 See Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
(Summer 1994) at 122, 130 [hereinafter War Crimes Trials]. The Nuremberg jurisprudence
suggested that war crimes, if committed in a widespread, systematic manner on political,
racial, or religious grounds, may also amount to crimes against humanity. Id. Proof of sys-
tematic governmental planning of alleged acts was a requirement of crimes against hu-
manity. Id. There is no such requirement for war crimes; crimes against humanity are
therefore more difficult to establish. Id.; see also Rape as a Crime, supra note 11, at 428.
Proof of systematic planning is required pursuant to the United Nations War Crimes Com-
mission. Id.
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rape or other crimes of sexual violence as a crime against human-
ity, the prosecutor would have to prove that the conduct was part
of such systematic action engaged in for such a purpose. 142 Acquir-
ing evidence of such planning or action may be difficult and pres-
ent an obstacle to effective prosecution. 143
B. Rape as Genocide
A similar evidentiary problem arises in charging widespread or
systematic rape as genocide. Under the Genocide Convention, cer-
tain acts committed with the "intent to destroy . . . a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group" constitutes genocide. 144 These
acts include causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group, deliberately inflicting conditions on the group calcu-
lated to bring about its destruction and imposing measures in-
tended to prevent births within the group. 145 Thus, prosecuting
rape or other crimes of sexual violence as genocide requires proof
of this specific intent as a necessary element.146 The difficulty in
such cases would be establishing the specific intent
requirement. 147
C. Rape as a Violation of the Laws or Customs of War or as a
Grave Breach of the Geneva Conventions
Given the evidentiary problems associated with proving crimes
against humanity and genocide, the only remaining options would
be to prosecute rape or other crimes of sexual violence as a "lesser"
offense of either a "violation of the laws or customs of war" or a
142 See War Crimes Trials, supra note 141, at 130 (discussing difficulties encountered
when prosecuting war crimes).
143 See id. at 133 (noting evidence gathered by Commission of Experts, International
Tribunal, and nongovernmental organizations may offset absence of "paper trail").
144 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also Statute, supra note 9, at art. 4, par. 2.
145 See Statute, supra note 9, at art. 3. The U.N. Convention on the Prevention or Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide to include: "killing members of the
group," "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and "deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part." Id. The Convention requires proving intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. Id.; see also War Crimes Trials,
supra note 141, at 428.
146 See, e.g., Pratt & Fletcher, supra note 11, at 97-8.
147 See id. at 97-102.
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"grave breach of the Geneva Conventions.""4 s This too may be
problematic given the traditional meanings of these terms.
"Violations of the laws or customs of war" are crimes against the
conventional or customary law committed by persons on one side
of a conflict against persons or property of the other side.14 9 Gen-
erally, these "war crimes" prohibit certain means and methods of
warfare such as use of poisonous weapons, wanton destruction of
cities not justified by military necessity, and attack or bombard-
ment of undefended towns. 150 Rape would not appear to fall
within this definition. Moreover, even if rape were to be consid-
ered within the conventional or customary definition of "war
crimes," rape of a citizen of one's own nationality might not be. 15 1
The 1949 Geneva Conventions categorized war crimes as either
ordinary crimes or "grave breaches" of the convention. 52 Grave
breaches are subject to universal jurisdiction, while ordinary
crimes are not. 153 Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are
serious acts committed against an individual protected by the Ge-
neva Conventions including willful killing, torture, inhuman
treatment and willfully causing great suffering to body or
health.15 4 Rape and other crimes of sexual violence under interna-
tional law may constitute inhuman treatment or willfully causing
great suffering to body or health; and, under some circumstances,
the conduct may constitute torture.' 55
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that the offense is
only a grave breach if committed against a "protected person. '"56
Generally, the Geneva Conventions only include wounded and
sick combatants, medical and religious personnel, prisoners of
148 See Theodor Meron, War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International
Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78, 84 (1994) (hoping that prosecution of "the far more frequent
cases of rape that are regarded as 'lesser' war crimes or grave breaches" is not neglected).
149 See Report, supra note 9, at par. 34.
150 See Statute, supra note 9, at art. 3.
151 See Rape as a Crime, supra note 11 at 426 n.19 (noting that customarily, war crimes
can only be committed against persons belonging to "other side").
152 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
(Geneva Convention IV), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See Rape as a Crime, supra note 11, at 426 (asserting that rape can rise to level of
torture in certain instances).
156 See Report, supra note 9, at art. 2. The pertinent part of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia provides: "The International Tribunal shall have the
power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949," thereafter listing the proscribed acts contem-
plated. Id. at 192.
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war, shipwrecked persons and civilians in an occupied territory
who are not of the same nationality as the perpetrator within its
definitions of "protected person."157 If the victim is not a "pro-
tected person," then the rape or other crime of sexual violence
would not be considered a "grave breach" within the jurisdiction of
the International Tribunal.15 8
Thus, in some circumstances, absent evidence of a "widespread
or systematic attack" required of crimes against humanity or the
specific intent required of genocide,' 5 9 certain crimes of sexual vio-
lence would not fall within the definitions described above.' 60 In
obviating this pitfall, one possible alternative is to charge rape as
a violation of the laws and customs of war as reflected in Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions' 6 ' rather than as a grave
breach.' 62 These articles apply to non-international armed con-
flicts and generally mandate that all persons not participating in
the conflict be "treated humanely." 63 Also, they specifically pro-
hibit "violence to life and person,"164 as well as "outrages upon
157 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention I), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13
(wounded and sick combatants), arts. 24, 26 (medical and religious personnel) 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Conven-
tion II), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (shipwrecked combatants);
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III),
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (prisoners of war); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), Aug.
12, 1949, art. 4, par. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (civilians in conflict or occupied
territory).
158 See Report, supra note 9, at art. 2. See generally supra note 162.
159 See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Indictment
Against Nikolic, Nov. 7, 1994, reprinted in 34 I.L.M. 996 (1994). Charge 1.3 of the indict-
ment of Dragon Nikolic demonstrate "specific intent." Id. It reads:
From about 13 June 1992 to about 24 June 1992, in Susica Camp Dragan Nikolic com-
mitted a Crime against Humanity by participating in the murder of Durmo Handzic
during a period of armed conflict and as part of a widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian population, an offense recognized by Article 5(a) of the Stat-
ute of the Tribunal.
Id. at 998.
160 See Oren Gross, The Grave Breaches System and the Armed Conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 783, 786 (1995) (concluding that rape may actually be
considered grave breach of Geneva Conventions despite fact that it was not explicitly men-
tioned as such).
161 See Geneva Conventions I, II, I, and IV, supra note 157.
162 See Geneva Convention LV, supra note 157, at 287. This protection would likely be
best covered by Article 3 under Convention IV. Id.
163 See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 157, at 287.
164 See id.
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personal dignity."165 Certainly, such conduct encompasses rape
and other crimes of sexual violence.
CONCLUSION
The goal of the international community in prosecuting viola-
tions of international humanitarian law with respect to crimes of
sexual violence should be to prosecute all impermissible sexual be-
havior. Prosecuting only those offenses traditionally considered to
constitute "rape" would leave unpunished at international law an
entire range of conduct no less reprehensible and no less in need of
society's moral condemnation.
Although the consensus of the international community is that,
under certain circumstances, "rape" ought to be punished as a vio-
lation of international humanitarian law, there is likely a lack of
similar consensus regarding the circumstances and range of con-
duct that should be punished given the various legal traditions
and cultures represented.
Accordingly, the international community should give serious
consideration to including a "criminal sexual conduct" provision in
any "code of crimes" it adopts. This code should make punishable
the full range of crimes of sexual violence, including all acts of
sexual penetration or contact committed by force or coercion. The
punishment should be heightened if the conduct results in either
physical or mental injury. Of course, for the crime to fall within
the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal, or any other simi-
larly constituted body, would also require proof satisfying jurisdic-
tional "aggravating" factors. As such, any definition must include
the intent, the "protected status," or the other requirements de-
scribed above.
Michigan's criminal sexual conduct statute provides a model for
the international community. As discussed, the statute provides
for the prosecution of a wider range of offenses than the tradi-
tional common law understanding of rape, while shifting the focus
of the trial to the assailant's use of force or coercion from the vic-
tim's state of mind. Moreover, the statute provides a comprehen-
sive scheme that removes the traditional male-oriented view of
rape, not only by making the crime gender-neutral, but also by
165 See id.
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including punishable conduct in addition to sexual intercourse.
Such a statute at international law would advance the interest in
punishing all impermissible sexual conduct and would better ap-
proach a modern view of what should be punishable as a crime of
sexual violence.
